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Note that this paper is not exactly the same as the final published version and researchers 5 interested in using this work are encouraged to access the published version (Beilock & Carr, 2001 ). Second, if experts are instructed to try to attend to 79 the individual steps originally involved in executing a task, they are assumed to retrieve the 80 integrated units from LTM into working memory and then have to decompose them into 81 slower and less proficient control structures (Masters, 1992) . This additional cognitive 82 activity is predicted to interfere with normal execution and thus degrade performance.
83
Empirical support for these two claims is reviewed below. Space limits constraint our review 84 to a small but representative set of studies. We first examine whether verbal report 85 procedures used in studies of experts' thoughts during performance elicit data that accurately provide written responses concerning their episodic memory for the last putt in a putt series.
91
On average, novices reported around two more steps than experts concerning motor 92 mechanics (e.g., hand positions on putter, swing action), which is consistent with the 93 automaticity account that experts have poorer recall than novices of the detailed steps of their 94 performance. However, the episodic recall instructions used by Beilock and Carr (2001, 95 Experiments 1 & 2) differ from the standard procedures for eliciting "think-aloud" instructions asked participants to: "Pretend that your friend just walked into the room.
98
Describe the last putt you took, in enough detail so that your friend could perform the same 99 putt you just took" (p. 725). Thus, participants were asked to describe and explain what they 100 did rather than merely report on their thoughts. In a review, Fox et al. (2011) found that facilitates expert performance.
120
In a subsequent study, Beilock the same location prior to the collection of think-aloud data.
230
Third, our study included only two practice putts, during which the participant 231 thought aloud, prior to the main testing phase; the putt location and distance was the same for 232 the 2 practice putts but the putt distance was different between the practice putts and the putts 233 used in the main testing phase. The rationale for this aspect of our study design was that a 234 golfer has only one opportunity to putt from a given location during competition on a golf
235
course, yet many studies have not analysed the first putts from a given location and, in fact, 
247
According to the automaticity account, skilled performers would be predicted to Simon, 1993). In our procedure, the coder would make the decisions about the coding of each 302 statement in the presented protocol.
303
A coding scheme with eight categories was developed during a pilot study. The
304
Assessment code concerned identification of the putt properties ("this is about 6 feet").
305
Response identification concerned identification, selection, and planning of the intended ball 306 path and required putt parameters ("more strength into my swing" anxiety (1 = not tense, 11 = tense); and self-confidence (1 = not confident, 11 = confident).
345
Correlations between the MRF-3 items and the associated CSAI-2 subscales range from .68 346 to .76 (Krane, 1994) .
347

Procedure
348
Participants first completed the think-aloud training. Next, for each putt distance
349
(short & long), participants examined the putt distance and rated their task self-efficacy. 
389
Results
390
Preliminary analyses
391
Task self-efficacy. The interaction of putt length by group was not significant. There 
498
According to the cognitive control account, both the more-skilled and less-skilled 499 golfers were predicted to verbalize more thoughts during higher-complexity putts (i.e., longer 500 distance putts & putts under higher stress) than lower-complexity putts. The automaticity 501 account would not predict an effect on verbalized thoughts of these "complexity"
502
manipulations for the more-skilled golfers; only the less-skilled golfers would be predicted to 503 generate more thoughts during higher-complexity putts. Our results indicate that both the 504 more-skilled and the less-skilled golfers verbalized more task-relevant thoughts when 505 performing longer distance putts. The effect of increasing putt length on the number of 506 verbalized thoughts was greater for the more-skilled golfers than the less-skilled golfers.
507
These results are consistent with the cognitive control account. The results also showed that 508 both the more-skilled and the less-skilled golfers verbalized more task-relevant thoughts 509 when putting under higher stress, but only if they encountered a new putting location (i.e., the 510 first putt within a two-putt trial); see the results of the analyses of the effect of putt order on 511 task-relevant thoughts. If the golfers executed the same putt from the same location (i.e., the 512 second putt within a two-putt trial), putting under higher stress did not affect the number of 513 task-relevant thoughts. In addition, the more-skilled golfers verbalized more task-relevant 514 thoughts when they encountered a new putting location, as compared to executing the same 515 putt from the same location; in contrast, this difference was not observed for the less-skilled 516 golfers. These results are more consistent with the cognitive control account of skilled 517 performance than the automaticity account.
518
The analyses of mechanics thoughts revealed that the number of verbalized thoughts 519 related to putting mechanics did not significantly differ between the groups. Putting from a 520 new location was the only condition that affected the number of mechanics-related thoughts.
521
Specifically, during the first putt within a two-putt trial, almost one thought on average (M = 522 0.95) was verbalized related to putting mechanics, whereas this value was slightly but 523 23 significantly less for the second putt (M = 0.81). Both skill groups verbalized less than one 524 thought related to putting mechanics per putt on average, which corresponds to less than 15% 525 of all task-relevant thoughts.
526
The analyses of the strategy thoughts revealed that the more-skilled golfers verbalized 527 a considerable amount of thoughts concerning strategic features of putting (~1.5 per putt on 528 average) and significantly more of these thoughts (~1 more per putt on average) than the less-529 skilled golfers. One of the two putt complexity manipulations affected the number of strategy 530 thoughts verbalized. Specifically, more strategy thoughts were verbalized during the long 531 putts than the short putts; but the number of strategy thoughts did not differ between the low-532 and high-stress conditions. Also, more strategy thoughts were verbalized during the first putt 533 within a two-putt trial than the second putt within a two-putt trial.
534
General Discussion
535
The purpose of this study was to test the automaticity and cognitive control accounts Toner and Moran (2011) studied a single group of expert golfers with a mean 542 handicap of 3.56, which is similar to that of our more-skilled group. They used a longer putt 543 distance (i.e., more complex putt) than our longest putt distance. Therefore, based on the 544 cognitive control account, Toner and Moran's group of golfers should have verbalized more 545 thoughts than our more-skilled group. However, Toner and Moran's golfers reported only 546 two thoughts per putt on average, which is roughly four thoughts less than our more-skilled 547
golfers. An informal review of the verbalized thoughts presented by Toner and Moran (see 548 Table IV , p. 680) shows that, although their skilled golfers reported fewer thoughts than ours, 549 the content of the thoughts is similar across the two studies. Consistent with our study, Toner
550
and Moran found relatively few thoughts related to putting mechanics: An average of 551 approximately one such thought per putt was reported, which is similar to our findings.
552
Thus, the primary difference between Toner and Moran's (2011) study and our study 553 concerns the amount of strategy thoughts verbalized, which might be due to procedural 554 differences. In our study participants were given the standard think-aloud instructions, which on and participants were instructed to state aloud any thoughts relating to the task of which 561 they were consciously aware. Participants were instructed to state aloud any task-related 562 thoughts while they were addressing the ball and once the putt had been executed" (p. 678).
563
When the golfers had finished stating such thoughts, the dictaphone was switched off and the There are qualitative differences in methodology between our study and the study by putt, whereas this value was 1.14 for our more-skilled golfers.
584
Differences in the methodology between the two studies likely account for most of the This study included a range of putting conditions that could be realized in a laboratory 606 setting and found that longer distance putts, and putts made under higher stress from a new 607 starting location led to increases in the amount of thoughts verbalized during the putt.
608
However, attempting a novel putt at a golf course during a real competition on a real putting 609 green, with its undulating grass surface, is undoubtedly more complex. In particular, our were significantly affected by the manipulation, cognitive anxiety remained relatively low 615 and self-confidence remained relatively high in absolute terms following the manipulation.
616
Thus, we predict that under conditions that involve executing each putt only once on a real 617 green and/or better representations of the stress of a real tournament, golfers will generate 618 even more thoughts and the content of these thoughts will differ as a function of skill.
619
An additional consideration when interpreting our results is that we did not assess or 620 control for golfers' experiences of yips, a motor phenomenon characterized by an involuntary 621 movement that can affect putting performance (Klämpfl, Lobinger, & Raab, 2013 were standardized, such that these procedures were identical for members of each group.
637
Concluding Remarks
638
The present study provides evidence that supports the cognitive control account of 639 skilled performance and is mostly inconsistent with the automaticity account of performance 640 on the putting task. Our findings suggest that different cognitive mechanisms mediate expert 641 performance than the habitual performance of "everyday" tasks. 
682
Our results also showed that the execution of putts from the same location again and 683 again can be a confounding factor that influences the amount and content of thinking during 684 laboratory experiments. The number of factors that are relevant to the putting task on real 685 greens is far greater than on laboratory putting greens and thus skilled golfers are likely 686 engage in more thinking when playing on real courses than lower-skilled players. Whitehead,
687
Taylor, and Polman (2016) showed that the thought processes of highly skilled golfers 688 playing on a real golf course change in response to competitive pressure, but this was not true 689 for less-skilled golfers. An important challenge for future research studying differences in 690 putting skill will be to have participants perform identical putting tasks on actual golf 691 courses.
692
In conclusion, this study has provided evidence that skilled task performance does not undertaken with gender as the between-subjects factor. The results showed no significant 710 main effect of gender for task-relevant, strategy, and mechanics thoughts. location for the second putt was always the same as for first putt within a trial.
716
Consequently, the appropriate onset point for the task duration measure of the second putt 717 was putter-ball contact for the first putt. Unlike the second putt within a trial, the first putt
718
was not taken immediately after the previous putt (i.e., the second putt in the previous 719 trial) because trials were separated by a short break, and was not taken from the same 720 starting location as the previous putt, because this location was always different between 721 any two contiguous trials. Thus, for the first putt in a trial, participants typically did not 722 31 begin to assess the demands of the putt until after retrieving the ball from the stand to 723 begin that putt, and thus the appropriate onset point for the task duration measure for the 724 first putt was act of retrieving the ball from the stand. 
